CVE-2026-45330

Description

The verification admin mutation flow allows accessing, verifying, and rejecting participants records from another tenant.

Technical description

The verification admin controllers loads pending_authorization_id with a raw Authorization.find(...) and then authorizes the record without checking whether it belongs to current_organization.

Reproduction steps:

1. An org2 participant uploads their ID:

2. An admin from another organisation, in this case org1, is able to open the ID from org2 by opening request 35, e.g http://localhost:3001/admin/id_documents/pending_authorizations/35/confirmations/new

3. The admin then approves this request by looking up the ID in the picture (not shown in this image, but a real ID would expose this)

4. Now the request has been approved, which can be seen from the org2 participant authorizations page:

Impact

A tenant admin can access, reject or approve another tenant's id_documents requests.

Patches

See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16666

Workarounds

Disable the "Identity documents" verification

Reference

OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control

Credits

This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the Decidim Association and made by Radically Open Security against Decidim financed by NGI.