npm · pnpm
pnpm: Git Fetch Argument Injection via Lockfile resolution.commit
pnpm passes the lockfile-controlled git resolution.commit value to git fetch without a -- separator or commit-format validation. For git dependencies fetched through the shallow-fetch path, a malicious lockfile can replace the expected 40-character commit hash with a Git option such as --upload-pack=<command>. For SSH and local transports, --upload-pack can execute the supplied command. HTTPS transports ignore --upload-pack, so the practical attack surface is primarily SSH or local git dependencies.
The vulnerable path is in fetching/git-fetcher/src/index.ts. When a git dependency host is configured for shallow fetching, pnpm calls:
await execGit(['fetch', '--depth', '1', 'origin', resolution.commit], { cwd: tempLocation })
Because resolution.commit is appended before a -- separator, Git can parse a commit value beginning with - as an option. The same file later passes the value to git checkout without a separator:
await execGit(['checkout', resolution.commit], { cwd: tempLocation })
resolution.commit comes from the lockfile and is typed as a plain string; pnpm does not validate it as a 40-character hexadecimal commit before passing it to Git.
bash autofyn_audit/exploits/vuln11_git_upload_pack_rce/exploit.sh
# Creates a local bare git repo and triggers the shallow-fetch path.
# Replaces the lockfile commit hash with '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/vuln11_pwned'.
# Result: PASS -- /tmp/vuln11_pwned created by injected touch command.
The PoC uses a local file://githost/... repository because the injection requires a local or SSH transport. HTTPS transport ignores --upload-pack.
Code execution as the user running pnpm install, under specific transport conditions. The attacker must modify pnpm-lock.yaml, and the affected dependency must use SSH or local git transport. HTTPS transport (the common case) is immune.
Add a -- separator before lockfile-controlled git revision values. Validate resolution.commit matches /^[0-9a-f]{40}$/i before passing to Git.
Discovered by AutoFyn Full audit report: audit_report.md Exploit script: exploit.sh
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.