Go · oras.land/oras-go/v2
oras-go blob upload vulnerable to credential forwarding via unvalidated Location header
oras-go follows a registry-controlled Location header during the monolithic blob upload flow and reuses the Authorization header from the initial POST request for the subsequent PUT request. If a malicious registry returns a cross-host Location, oras-go can send the caller's credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
tested: v2.6.0 (commit 03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1, as-of 2026-01-24) range: unknown; likely affects earlier v2.x releases that include the same upload flow
Credential leak to an attacker-controlled endpoint and client-side ssrf to a cross-host target.
registry/remote/repository.go:878-916 (blobStore.completePushAfterInitialPost)Attachments include poc.zip with a local-only harness (no real registry required). It runs a fake registry server that returns a cross-host Location and a second server that records whether it received Authorization.
unzip -q -o poc.zip -d /tmp/poc
cd /tmp/poc/poc-F-ORAS-LOCATION-UPLOAD-001
make canonical
make control
Location before uploading (scheme + hostname + effective port) against the original request, or require an explicit opt-in allowlist for cross-host upload urlsAuthorization when the upload target changes host or schemeregistry/remote/repository.go (see blobStore.completePushAfterInitialPost)Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.
Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.