npm · openclaw
OpenClaw: Control UI locality spoofing could mint a durable admin device token
In affected LAN/shared-token Control UI deployments, a caller could spoof locality information used during Control UI pairing and obtain a durable admin-capable device token.
This issue is limited to deployments where the caller already has the network/authentication foothold needed to reach the Control UI pairing path. It is not an unauthenticated internet exposure issue.
This affects configurations such as LAN-bound gateways or shared-token Control UI access where locality signals were accepted as sufficient for pairing decisions.
A temporary or shared Control UI access path could be turned into a persistent admin device token. That token could remain useful after the shared gateway token was rotated, unless the paired device was removed.
The issue is a pairing/locality validation problem: locality-derived trust was stronger than it should have been.
The first stable patched version is 2026.5.22.
Upgrade to openclaw@2026.5.22 or later. For older deployments, remove unexpected paired devices and avoid exposing Control UI pairing paths on networks with untrusted clients.
Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.
Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.