Maven · org.verapdf:validation-model
veraPDF Validation XXE via Rich Text
Description An XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious rich-text (/RC or /RV) entry. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation.
The vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/tools/DictionaryKeysHelper.java within the getRichTextStringOrStreamEntryStringRepresentation() method. This helper extracts the XHTML rich-text body from a PDF dictionary string or stream and parses it with a DOM parser to return the concatenated text content.
The vulnerability stems from two combined issues:
<!DOCTYPE … SYSTEM "…"> and <!ENTITY … SYSTEM "…"> declarations. getAllNodeText() recursively concatenates every text node in the document and returns it as the model property value. This means the expanded contents of any external entity are reflected directly back into the validation report.This impacts all current releases of the veraPDF validation-model module.
Successful exploitation requires only that the target validate an attacker-supplied PDF. A single markup annotation with a crafted /RC string is sufficient.
Harden the DocumentBuilderFactory in validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/tools/DictionaryKeysHelper.java per the OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet to disallow DOCTYPE outright.
Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.
Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.