Packagist · backpack/crud
Laravel Backpack CRUD: OS command injection in Stats::makeCurlRequest via attacker-controlled Host header (pre-auth)
Backpack\CRUD\Stats::makeCurlRequest builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP Host header, then passes it to exec(). A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.
The vulnerable code path is reached from BackpackServiceProvider::boot() on every HTTP request in production when exec() and curl are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.
High — CVSS 8.1CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Attack Complexity is rated High because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and exec() is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.
A successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (www-data, nginx, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in .env), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach.
makeCurlRequest was replaced with the Guzzle-based path already present in the codebase, eliminating the shell-command construction entirely. Upgrade to a patched release immediately.
| Branch | Vulnerable range | First safe version |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.x | < 4.1.70 |
4.1.70 |
| 5.x | < 5.6.2 |
5.6.2 |
| 6.x | < 6.8.13 |
6.8.13 |
| 7.x | < 7.0.36 |
7.0.36 |
Reported by Vishal Shukla (@shukla304) via sechub.dev AI Agent.
Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.
Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.