Go · github.com/bablilayoub/openhole
openhole-server vulnerable to path traversal via URL-decoded request path
openhole-server forwarded the URL-decoded request path (r.URL.Path) to tunnel clients instead of the original request-target. Percent-encoded dot-segments (%2e) and separators (%2f) were decoded to ../ and / before reaching the local service.
Go's ServeMux rejects literal ../ paths, but percent-encoded traversal sequences bypassed this and were delivered to backends as working path traversal.
An unauthenticated remote attacker could read files outside the published web root on tunneled local services that resolve paths without canonicalization.
Example:
/%2e%2e/secret.txt → file outside web root/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd → sensitive filesEncoded slashes (/a%2fb) could also bypass path-based access controls.
v0.1.2 forwards r.URL.EscapedPath() on the server and preserves the request-target on the CLI client.
Users should upgrade both openhole-server and the openhole CLI to v0.1.2 or later.
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.