Packagist · nukeviet/nukeviet
NukeViet: Pre-authentication SSRF via X-Forwarded-Host
An unauthenticated attacker can coerce the server into issuing HTTP requests to an attacker-chosen host by spoofing the X Forwarded-Host (and X-Forwarded-Proto) request headers. The forwarded host is used, without validation, to build the URL that server_info_update() fetches with cURL, resulting in a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) that requires no authentication.
includes/ini.php — function server_info_update() (cURL sink)vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Server.php — standardizeHost() and the forwarded-header handling in the constructor (source of the tainted host)POST request containing the field __serverInfoUpdate=1, handled early in includes/ini.php before any authentication.NukeViet\Core\Server derives original_host / original_protocol from the X-Forwarded-Host / X-Forwarded-Proto headers and exposes them via getOriginalHost() / getOriginalProtocol(). These values are attacker-controlled and were not validated against the site's configured domains (my_domains).
In server_info_update() the tainted host and scheme are concatenated directly into a cURL URL:
$proto = $nv_Server->getOriginalProtocol(); // from X-Forwarded-Proto
$host = $nv_Server->getOriginalHost(); // from X-Forwarded-Host
$ch = curl_init($proto . '://' . $host . NV_BASE_SITEURL . 'index.php?response_headers_detect=1');
curl_exec($ch);
Two factors made this reliably reachable:
__serverInfoUpdate handler runs very early in includes/ini.php, before authentication, so the sink is reachable pre-auth.standardizeHost() stripped a trailing port only with the regex (\:[0-9]+)$, which is bypassed by appending a slash (e.g. 127.0.0.1:8081/): the string no longer ends in :digits, so the port survives and an arbitrary host:port reaches the cURL call.POST /index.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <victim>
X-Forwarded-Proto: http
X-Forwarded-Host: <attacker-controlled-host>:<port>/
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 20
__serverInfoUpdate=1
The server then issues a request to the attacker-supplied host, confirmed via an out-of-band interaction (DNS + HTTP) on a collaborator endpoint.
The SSRF is blind, HEAD-only, and uses a fixed request path (…/index.php?response_headers_detect=1):
config_ini cache and is not reflected to the attacker, so internal data cannot be exfiltrated directly.169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...) cannot be reached, and gopher:// / dict:// request smuggling cannot inject arbitrary payloads.What an attacker can do: unauthenticated internal host/port discovery (connection success/timing, with the port reachable through the regex bypass), and poisoning of the cached server_headers (the SSRF target's response headers are stored and applied to the site).
Rated High rather than Critical, because the blind + fixed-path + HEAD design of the sink prevents data exfiltration, cloud credential theft, and internal RCE.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:NX-Forwarded-*).Fixed by validating and normalising the forwarded values at the source and gating the request before the sink:
standardizeHost() now extracts the host with parse_url() (defeats the :port/ bypass) and lower-cases it.X-Forwarded-Proto is restricted to a {http, https} allow-list and falls back to the real server protocol otherwise.X-Forwarded-Port is validated as numeric and within range.my_domains before includes/ini.php is reached; non-matching hosts are rejected/redirected, and server_info_update() additionally re-validates its target host against my_domains (defense in depth).Configure the reverse proxy / web server to strip or override client-supplied X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto, and X-Forwarded-Port headers, and ensure my_domains is configured with the site's canonical domain(s).
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.