high

CVE-2026-59902

Maven · io.netty:netty-transport-sctp

Summary

Netty: Memory Exhaustion in SctpMessageCompletionHandler

Severity
high
CVSS
7.5
EPSS
0.4% (p30)
CWE
CWE-400
Also known as
GHSA-2qj4-mmr9-4v2f
Published
2026-08-17
Updated
2026-08-17

Advisory details

Summary

SctpMessageCompletionHandler does not limit the total size of buffered fragments, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to cause an OutOfMemoryError by sending large SCTP fragments.

Details

io.netty.handler.codec.sctp.SctpMessageCompletionHandler buffers fragments for incomplete SCTP messages. The fix for CVE-2026-46340 fixed unbounded memory growth by introducing limits on the number of concurrent incomplete messages (maxIncompleteSctpMessages) and the number of fragments per message (maxFragments).

While the count of fragments is now bounded, the handler still does not enforce a maximum size in bytes.

With the default limits of 128 messages and 128 fragments, and a typical max SCTP chunk size of 64KB, an attacker can consume up to ~1GB per connection. By opening a small number of concurrent connections, an attacker can easily exhaust the server's memory, causing an OutOfMemoryError.

Impact

Memory Exhaustion. Any application using Netty's SCTP transport with SctpMessageCompletionHandler is impacted.

References

Related advisories

Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.

Check my repo

Summarize with AI

ChatGPTClaudePerplexity

Sources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.