npm · @rhinostone/swig-jinja2
@rhinostone/swig: arbitrary local file read via include/extends path traversal
@rhinostone/swig is a maintained fork of the abandoned swig template engine and inherited the directory-traversal vulnerability tracked upstream as CVE-2023-25345 / GHSA-2rq5-699j-x7p6. The {% include %}, {% extends %}, and {% import %} tags resolve their target path through the filesystem loader without confining the result to the configured template root. A path that traverses upward (../) escapes the root and reads an arbitrary file from the host filesystem, whose contents are emitted into the rendered output.
The dangerous case does not require the attacker to control template source — only template data (the locals passed at render time). An application that renders a trusted template whose include / extends path is variable-driven is exposed:
// application code — a configured filesystem loader with a basepath
swig.renderFile('page.html', { partial: req.query.partial });
{# page.html — trusted template #}
{% include partial %}
Setting ?partial=../../../../etc/passwd makes the loader resolve and read that file, and its contents are rendered into the response. A literal in trusted source is equally affected: {% include "../../../etc/passwd" %}.
Arbitrary local file disclosure (confidentiality). An attacker able to influence an include / extends / import path — directly, or via untrusted locals — can read files outside the template directory: application configuration, credentials, source code, /etc/passwd, and so on. There is no integrity or availability impact.
Every published version up to and including 2.7.0 is affected — @rhinostone/swig, and the shared @rhinostone/swig-core loader, hence @rhinostone/swig-twig, @rhinostone/swig-jinja2, and @rhinostone/swig-django as well.
Fixed in 2.7.1: the filesystem loader now rejects any include / extends / import path that resolves outside the configured basepath root, including paths supplied through an untrusted runtime variable. A new allowOutsideRoot loader option is available for the rare case of intentionally reading files from outside the root.
Upgrade to 2.7.2 or later: 2.7.1 fixed the vulnerability but introduced a regression — a relative basepath wrongly rejected every in-root template path. 2.7.2 resolves the basepath to an absolute path before the check and restores correct in-root resolution.
2.7.2 (or later).basepath, and never pass untrusted data into an {% include %} / {% extends %} / {% import %} path.Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.
Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.