PyPI · uv
uv's bundled CA store trusts an emSign root whose intermediate CA keys are compromised
By default, uv verifies TLS connections against a vendored copy of the webpki-root-certs bundle. Versions before 0.13.4 include the emSign ECC Root CA - G3 root. Eight eMudhra intermediate CA certificates that chain to that root have compromised private keys, and the CA has revoked them.
An attacker with one of the compromised keys can issue certificates that uv accepts for any hostname, and can be used to issue certificates to enable MITM attacks.
uv 0.13.4 removes the root from its vendored bundle, following webpki-root-certs 1.0.10. Upgrade to 0.13.4 or later.
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.