Packagist · froxlor/froxlor
Froxlor: Authenticated customers can read other customers' allowed sender aliases
An authenticated customer can read other customers' allowed sender aliases from Froxlor's sender-delete confirmation page when mail.enable_allow_sender is enabled. customer_email.php loads allowed_sender by global auto-increment senderid alone, so a customer can enumerate foreign sender alias IDs and make Froxlor disclose those values in the confirmation dialog for the attacker's own mailbox.
The vulnerable read lives in customer_email.php:
$senderid = Request::any('senderid', 0);
...
$sel_stmt = Database::prepare("SELECT `allowed_sender` FROM `" . TABLE_MAIL_SENDER_ALIAS . "` WHERE `id` = :sid");
$sender_data = Database::pexecute_first($sel_stmt, ['sid' => $senderid]);
HTML::askYesNo('email_reallydelete_sender', $filename, [
'id' => $id,
'senderid' => $senderid,
'page' => $page,
'domainid' => $email_domainid,
'action' => $action
], $idna_convert->decode($result['email_full']) . ' -> ' . $sender_data['allowed_sender']);
The query does not scope senderid to the current customer or to the mailbox being edited. mail_sender_aliases.id is a global AUTO_INCREMENT primary key:
CREATE TABLE `mail_sender_aliases` (
`id` int(11) NOT NULL auto_increment,
`email` varchar(255) NOT NULL,
`allowed_sender` varchar(255) NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
)
That makes sender alias IDs enumerable. A customer who owns any mailbox with sender-alias management enabled can request the delete-confirmation page for their own mailbox while supplying foreign senderid values. Froxlor then renders the foreign allowed_sender string in the confirmation prompt.
Verified against Froxlor 2.3.6 on a fresh test install with mail.enable_allow_sender=1.
victim and attacker.info@victim.local -> leaked-sender@example.org
/customer_email.php?page=senders&domainid=4&action=delete&id=2&senderid=1
Observed in the live test instance:
Do you really want to delete the allowed sender info@attacker.local -> leaked-sender@example.org?
The attacker-controlled mailbox identifier stayed info@attacker.local, but the disclosed sender alias text came from the victim-owned row identified by senderid=1.
An authenticated customer can enumerate global sender alias IDs and read other customers' allowed sender values. This is a cross-tenant information disclosure. It does not let the attacker delete the foreign alias because the delete action revalidates ownership.
Scope the sender alias lookup to the current customer and mailbox before rendering the confirmation page. The confirmation flow should fetch the sender alias through the same ownership checks used by EmailSender::delete().
Found by aisafe.io
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.