npm · openclaw
OpenClaw: Native command authorization could skip owner-command enforcement
Native command authorization could skip owner-command enforcement. In affected versions, a sender able to trigger native command handling could authorize a native command without enforcing the configured owner-only command policy.
This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could run an owner-style command from a sender that should not have that command access. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.
The first stable patched version is 2026.5.6.
keep native command surfaces limited to trusted senders until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.
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Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.