high

GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3

PyPI · GitPython

Summary

GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution

Severity
high
CVSS
8.8
CWE
CWE-78, CWE-88
Published
2026-07-24
Updated
2026-07-24

Advisory details

Summary

GitPython's check_unsafe_options guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened since) can be bypassed for every guarded method (clone/clone_from, fetch/pull/push, ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, archive) by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg. In the default allow_unsafe_options=False configuration this yields arbitrary command execution via --upload-pack.

Root Cause

The guard builds its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only: _option_candidates([], {"n":"--upload-pack=<cmd>"}) returns ['-n'] (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives the candidate from the key, never the value). -n is not on the denylist, so check_unsafe_options passes. But transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True) (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits two argv tokens ['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']. git then parses the second token as --upload-pack and executes the attacker-supplied command. The guard never inspects the value that becomes a separate argv token.

Impact

Arbitrary OS command execution as the host process (via --upload-pack) in the default configuration, affecting all guarded methods since they all build candidates through the name-only _option_candidates.

Proof of Concept

from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(bare_repo, out_dir, n="--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack")
# /tmp/ACE created -> ACE. Direct-name form upload_pack="..." is correctly BLOCKED.

File-write variant on a guarded revision command: iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path') -> candidate ['-g'] passes, argv ['-g','--output=/path'], victim file truncated.

Attack Chain

  1. Entry: app forwards a user-supplied options dict -> Repo.clone_from(url, path, n="--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack"). Guard: check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options) at base.py. Bypass proof: _option_candidates([], {"n":"--upload-pack=..."}) -> ['-n'] (key-only), not on denylist -> no UnsafeOptionError (verified live).
  2. Transform: transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True) -> ['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']. Guard: none (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified transform emits two tokens.
  3. Sink: git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack' -- <src> <dst>; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker created, verified end-to-end).

Bypass Evidence

Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): _option_candidates returns key-only candidate ['-n']; transform_kwargs emits the smuggled --upload-pack= token; clone_from with the payload created the marker file; the direct-name upload_pack= form raised UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore key, GHSA-2f96 long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option, GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split) are BLOCKED on HEAD — this is a distinct kwarg-value->separate-token vector.

Affected Versions

<= 3.1.53

Suggested Fix

Make _option_candidates also emit candidates derived from single-character kwarg VALUES when split_single_char_options is in effect, OR run check_unsafe_options over the fully-transformed argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate list.

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

References

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Sources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.