crates.io · surrealdb
SurrealDB: Graph traversal bypasses table SELECT permissions
An authenticated record or scope user could read records on any table reachable through a graph edge or REFERENCES TO back-reference, regardless of that table's PERMISSIONS FOR select clause.
Traversing SELECT * FROM source->edge->target returned full documents from target even when target was defined as PERMISSIONS FOR select NONE. The same bypass extended through multi-hop chains, so any table reachable by a sequence of edges from a readable starting point was exposed.
The root cause: GraphEdgeScan and ReferenceScan fetched records straight from storage without routing them through Document::pluck_select, so the target table's permission expression was never consulted.
An authenticated record or scope user can read records on any table reachable through a chain of graph edges or back-references from a table they have select on, regardless of the target's PERMISSIONS FOR select clause. Confidentiality-only and bounded to the caller's current database — namespace and database isolation are unaffected.
A new per-batch permission cache (exec::permission::CachedTableSelect) resolves each target table's SELECT permission once and filters yielded values through check_permission_for_value, matching the regular SELECT code path.
select permission on edge tables whose targets should be hidden.Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.
Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.