npm · openclaw
OpenClaw: Sandboxed session spawn could expose the real workspace path to child prompts
Sandboxed session spawn could expose the real workspace path to child prompts. In affected versions, a child session spawned from a sandboxed parent could forward the host workspace path into the child session prompt.
This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could reveal host workspace location or related memory context to the child model. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.
The first stable patched version is 2026.4.26.
avoid spawning child sessions from sensitive sandboxed workspaces until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.
Is your project exposed to this? Stateward checks every dependency on every pull request and flags it only if your code actually reaches it.
Check my repoSources: CISA KEV (public domain), OSV.dev & GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY-4.0), FIRST EPSS, NVD/CWE (public domain). Served live from the Stateward advisory database.