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WEB3-PHEMEX-2025

Web3 · CEX · Phemex

Summary

On January 23, 2025, exchange Phemex lost about $85M (early estimates started near $29M before rising) after attackers drained hot wallets across roughly 11-16 blockchains in a synchronized series of more than 125 transactions consistent with a compromised set of hot-wallet private keys; Phemex said the affected signing devices were identified and isolated, pointing to compromised signing infrastructure rather than an on-chain contract flaw. The attacker prioritized high-value tokens and swapped freezable assets into non-freezable ones before any freezes could land. Cold wallets stayed secure and Phemex covered the losses, resuming operations within days under Fireblocks MPC custody with keys split across distributed nodes. Flow-of-funds tracing (Merkle Science) and on-chain analysts (ZachXBT, Arkham), later supported by the FBI, attributed the theft to North Korea's Lazarus Group: on February 22, 2025 the attackers consolidated proceeds from the subsequent Bybit hack into the existing Phemex hacker address, retroactively linking the two incidents on-chain. Stolen funds were laundered via Tornado Cash and not recovered.

How to avoid it in your code

  • Hold operational balances in MPC/HSM custody with keys split across independent nodes, never single-location hot-wallet keys.
  • Cap and rate-limit hot-wallet exposure; keep the majority of assets in cold storage with withdrawal allowlists.
  • Isolate and harden signing infrastructure; monitor for simultaneous multi-chain outflows and auto-freeze on anomalies.
  • Segregate and audit key storage so one infrastructure compromise cannot expose keys for all chains.
  • Maintain real-time on-chain monitoring and coordinate rapid freezes with exchanges and stablecoin issuers.

References

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