Résumé
Quarkus: Authentication/Authorization Bypass via Advanced Path Normalization Vulnerabilities
Détails de l’avis
Quarkus HTTP path-based authorization policies can be bypassed using encoded semicolons (%3B) to smuggle matrix parameters past the security layer, and using encoded slashes (%2F) or backslashes (%5C) to access protected static resources. This is a distinct issue from CVE-2026-39852, which addressed only literal semicolon stripping.
Technical Details
The security layer (AbstractPathMatchingHttpSecurityPolicy) normalizes request paths using Vert.x's normalizedPath(), which only decodes unreserved RFC 3986 characters (letters, digits, -, ., _, ~). It then strips matrix parameters by looking for literal ; characters. This creates two mismatches:
- Encoded semicolons (
%3B): Since%3Bis not decoded by normalizedPath(), the matrix parameter stripping in pathWithoutMatrixParams() never sees it. The encoded semicolon and everything after it become part of the path segment, causing policy matching to fail. This affects all path-policy-protected endpoints. - Static resource path mismatch: Static resource handlers (StaticHandlerImpl, FileSystemStaticHandler) perform full
percent-decoding via URIDecoder.decodeURIComponent() and backslash-to-slash conversion before filesystem resolution.
Reserved characters like
%2F(slash) and%5C(backslash) that survive the security layer's partial decoding are fully decoded before file serving.
REST endpoints using Quarkus REST (RESTEasy Reactive) are not affected by the %2F/%5C vectors because the routing layer also uses normalizedPath() — both security and routing agree on the path, so no mismatch exists.
Attack Vectors
Encoded semicolon (matrix parameter smuggling), affects all path-policy-protected endpoints:
/api/admin%3Bbypass=true/data: security sees this as a single segmentadmin%3Bbypass=true, which does not match the/api/admin/* policy. The request passes through unauthenticated./api/secret%3b/data: same mechanism with lowercase hex digit.
Encoded slash/backslash on static resources, affects static files behind path policies:
/static-secret%2Fhtml, security does not match /static-secret.html policy; static handler decodes%2Fto/and may resolve the file./static-secret%5Chtml. static handler decodes%5Cto\, then converts to/.
Double encoding, affects static resources:
/secret%252Fconfidential.html, first decode by normalizedPath() turns%25into%, producing%2F. Static handler's second decode turns%2Finto/.
The following vectors were investigated and confirmed not exploitable:
- Unreserved character encoding (
/api/adm%69n/data):normalizedPath()decodes these. Both security and routing see/api/admin/data. - Null byte injection (
/api/admin%00/data):%00is not decoded bynormalizedPath(). - Encoded dot segments (
/api/%2e%2e/secret/data): Period is unreserved, so%2eis decoded to.bynormalizedPath(), thenremoveDots()normalizes..segments. - REST endpoint bypass via
%2F/%5C: Routing uses the samenormalizedPath()as security. The encoded slash/backslash doesn't match any route.
Root Cause
pathWithoutMatrixParams() operates on the partially-decoded output of normalizedPath(), where reserved characters
remain encoded. It searches for literal ; but never sees %3B. The fix (normalizePath()) performs full percent-decoding
in a loop before stripping matrix parameters, removing null bytes, normalizing backslashes, and resolving dot
segments, aligning the security layer's view of the path with what downstream handlers resolve.
Impact
- Unauthenticated access to endpoints protected by
quarkus.http.auth.permissionpath-based policies via%3Bsmuggling - Static resource exposure by bypassing path policies on protected files via
%2F/%5C - Applications using annotation-based security (
@RolesAllowed,@Authenticated) on JAX-RS resources without path-based policies are not affected by the%2F/%5Cvectors, but may still be affected by%3Bif path policies coexist
Proof of Concept
# Encoded semicolon bypass — works on any path-policy-protected endpoint
# Security sees "/api/admin%3Bbypass=true/data", doesn't match /api/admin/* policy
curl -v http://target/api/admin%3Bbypass=true/data
# Encoded semicolon on authenticated endpoint
curl -v http://target/api/secret%3b/data
# Static resource bypass via encoded slash (if static file behind path policy)
curl -v http://target/static-secret%2Fhtml
# Static resource bypass via encoded backslash
curl -v http://target/static-secret%5Chtml
Références
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qcxp-gm7m-4j5v
- https://github.com/quarkusio/quarkus/security/advisories/GHSA-qcxp-gm7m-4j5v
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50559
- https://github.com/quarkusio/quarkus/commit/919b80017d85564143a845b38e9cca54aff5b3cc
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26017
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26018
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26194
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26586
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