Résumé
Appium: Reflected XSS / arbitrary JS in @appium/base-driver /test/guinea-pig* routes
Détails de l’avis
Summary
Appium's base-driver mounts the built-in /test/guinea-pig, /test/guinea-pig-scrollable and /test/guinea-pig-app-banner routes unconditionally on every server. The handler reflects the throwError query param, the comments POST field, and the User-Agent request header into the returned HTML via compileLodashTemplate, which interpolates <%= expr %> as String(expr) with no HTML/JS escaping. This yields reflected XSS, and the throwError value is reflected inside a <script> block, giving arbitrary JavaScript execution on the server's origin. No authentication, no session, no driver and no plugin are required, and the default bind address is 0.0.0.0.
Details
Affected
@appium/base-driver10.6.0 (with Appium server 3.5.0); tested live.- Template engine helper:
@appium/base-driverlib/utils.tscompileLodashTemplate.
Location (file:line)
- Routes mounted unconditionally:
base-driver/lib/express/server.ts:216-219(app.all('/test/guinea-pig', guineaPig)etc.). - Tainting:
base-driver/lib/express/static.ts:35-61(guineaPigTemplate) —throwError = String(req.params.throwError ?? req.query?.throwError),params.comment = String(req.body.comments),params.userAgent = req.headers['user-agent']. - Unescaped render:
base-driver/lib/utils.ts:67-83(compileLodashTemplate) emits<%= expr %>asString(${expr})vianew Function(...), no escaping. - Sinks (shipped templates):
base-driver/static/test/guinea-pig.html:11-12(throwErrorinside<script>),:50(comment),:87(userAgent); same inguinea-pig-scrollable.html/guinea-pig-app-banner.html.
PoC
Requests:
GET /test/guinea-pig?throwError=x%27%2balert(document.domain)%2b%27
POST /test/guinea-pig (body: comments=</span><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>)
GET /test/guinea-pig (header: User-Agent: <script>alert(7)</script>)
Impact
An attacker who can get a victim to open a crafted link (or auto-submit a form) to the Appium server executes arbitrary JavaScript on the server's origin. With default CORS * + no authentication, that JS can drive the WebDriver REST API and plugin endpoints. The endpoints are debug/test fixtures that should not be reachable on a production listener at all.
Références
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3wgp-x9p5-c7cc
- https://github.com/appium/appium/security/advisories/GHSA-3wgp-x9p5-c7cc
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58191
- https://github.com/appium/appium/pull/22394
- https://github.com/appium/appium/commit/d94a40af9f8040191ee7888571a1c9d5aec59f89
- https://github.com/appium/appium/releases/tag/@appium/base-driver@10.7.0
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