CVE-2026-73557

Executive Summary

The follow-up protection for CVE-2025-62164 is incomplete at vLLM revision 26587f9519e22a5c4549ead7595ad9ca3229c4fd. It wraps serialized prompt-embedding reconstruction and dense conversion in torch.sparse.check_sparse_tensor_invariants(), but PyTorch 2.11.0 implements that context with save/enable/restore operations over process-global state. Two prompt-embedding parts in one /v1/chat/completions request are gathered concurrently on the event loop's default executor. When one context exits before the other loads its tensor, it can restore the global flag to False while the second part remains inside its guard.

In a deterministic run against hash-verified source from the affected revision, the actual target loader rejected an invalid sparse payload as a negative control. The frozen chat tracker then scheduled benign and malicious parts on distinct asyncio_0 and asyncio_1 threads. The benign context exited, the malicious loader observed the invariant flag disabled, and torch.load(weights_only=True) reconstructed indices [[10], [10]] for a declared shape of [3, 3]. The run intercepted the target's to_dense() call before it operated on the invalid tensor.

This primary trigger requires --enable-prompt-embeds, which is default-off, but it does not require renderer_num_workers > 1, a multimodal model, or --enable-mm-embeds. API authentication is optional in the stock server: middleware is installed only when CLI or environment API keys are supplied.

The lab proves bypass of the follow-up guard, invalid sparse reconstruction, and guarded-sink reachability. Crash and memory-corruption consequences are conditional on the behavior documented by the published CVE.

Background

CVE-2025-62164 / GHSA-mrw7-hf4f-83pf concerns client-controlled serialized prompt_embeds reaching torch.load(weights_only=True) and an invalid sparse tensor reaching to_dense(). The advisory attributes memory corruption, denial of service, and potential code execution to that historical unsafe operation.

The remediation chronology matters for duplicate handling:

• PR #27204, merge commit 58fab50d82838d5014f4a14d991fdb9352c9c84b on 2025-10-22, introduced the default-off enable_prompt_embeds gate. It did not add the sparse-invariant context.
• Commit 84e23d103d3483f944780d0d42bcf0993fd27e3a on 2025-12-15, titled additional protection for CVE-2025-62164 (#30649), added the process-global sparse-invariant context around load, type check, and dense conversion.
• Refactor commit f0a1c8453ad1c664c8a04c83fe545195fcd556eb on 2026-01-31 moved the guarded loader into vllm/renderers/embed_utils.py while preserving the same context.
• Chat content-part commit 14043dfecd35dd2f12b4d51eb9fa166184a0ca0f on 2026-05-01 introduced prompt_embeds chat parts and the concurrent one-request schedule described here.

This report therefore does not present the malformed sparse payload or to_dense() sink as new. It reports a distinct concurrency root cause and trigger: unsynchronized save/enable/restore of the process-global follow-up guard, reachable through the later multi-part chat scheduler.

The affected revision pins PyTorch 2.11.0 in pyproject.toml:10.

Vulnerability Details

The target's safe_load_prompt_embeds performs the guarded operation in vllm/renderers/embed_utils.py:16-39:

with torch.sparse.check_sparse_tensor_invariants():
    tensor = torch.load(
        BytesIO(pybase64.b64decode(embed, validate=True)),
        weights_only=True,
        map_location=torch.device("cpu"),
    )
    if not isinstance(tensor, torch.Tensor):
        raise VLLMValidationError(...)
    tensor = tensor.to_dense()

The context is not request-local. With the global flag initially disabled, we can describe the verified interleaving:

1. Benign part A enters, saves False, and enables the flag.
2. Malicious part B enters, saves True, and leaves the flag enabled.
3. A completes its load and exits, restoring its saved False value.
4. B remains lexically inside its context but observes the actual global flag as False.
5. B's torch.load(..., weights_only=True) reconstructs the malformed sparse tensor.
6. The target reaches tensor.to_dense() before later rank, hidden-size, and dtype checks.

weights_only=True constrains deserialization types; it does not compensate for a sparse invariant check that another request has disabled.

The complete stock actor-to-sink chain, traced in the affected source, is:

POST /v1/chat/completions (vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/api_router.py:41-61) -> OpenAIServingChat.create_chat_completion -> _create_chat_completion -> render_chat_request (vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/serving.py:206-280) -> OnlineRenderer.render_chat (vllm/renderers/online_renderer.py:95-190) -> preprocess_chat (vllm/renderers/online_renderer.py:335-380) -> BaseRenderer.render_chat_async (vllm/renderers/base.py:1070-1105) -> HfRenderer.render_messages_async (vllm/renderers/hf.py:1049-1085) -> parse_chat_messages_async (vllm/entrypoints/chat_utils.py:1911-1945) -> content-part parse_prompt_embeds and _load_prompt_embeds_async (vllm/entrypoints/chat_utils.py:1099-1120) -> AsyncMultiModalItemTracker.resolve_items (vllm/entrypoints/chat_utils.py:818-835) -> asyncio.gather of both prompt parts -> safe_load_prompt_embeds_async -> make_async -> loop.run_in_executor(executor=None, ...) (vllm/utils/async_utils.py:28-45) -> guarded torch.load -> to_dense().

The prompt async helper is created without an explicit executor, so it uses the event loop's default executor. This path is separate from the renderer's configurable pool. The deterministic scheduler run observed the two parts on distinct default-executor threads while leaving renderer_num_workers at its default of one.

prompt_embeds bypasses multimodal processing, and the tracker explicitly permits it when is_multimodal_model=False (vllm/entrypoints/chat_utils.py:793-837). Consequently, the primary trigger needs neither a multimodal model nor enable_mm_embeds.

The source also states that async wrappers must be thread-safe (vllm/utils/async_utils.py:28-38), while a target test acknowledges that the sparse flag is not thread-local and concurrent users can leak state (tests/renderers/test_sparse_tensor_validation.py:58-61).

Exploitability Analysis

The following evidence labels separate what was demonstrated from what remains conditional:

Label	Claim
Verified by run	PyTorch 2.11.0 rejects the identical invalid payload through the actual target loader without the race.
Verified by run	The hash-verified frozen tracker schedules two prompt parts on distinct default-executor threads, races the flag to False, reconstructs the invalid sparse tensor, and reaches the target to_dense() call while the interception prevents execution.
Traced in source	A client can supply multiple prompt_embeds content parts through the stock /v1/chat/completions route and the function chain above.
Traced in source	enable_prompt_embeds defaults to False (vllm/config/model.py:255-260), so the operator must opt in. enable_mm_embeds and non-default renderer workers are not preconditions for this path.
Traced in source	api_key defaults to None (vllm/entrypoints/openai/cli_args.py:264), and authentication middleware is installed only when a C