CVE-2026-72806

CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72806.

Summary

FilterViewByPublishAccess, the filter renderAttributeView applies for Reader sessions drops rows using only the hidden/forbidden check and never checks the publish password. Its three sibling filters all check both tiers. As a result, a publish RoleReader (or the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false) who has not entered a document's password still receives every database/attribute-view row bound to that password-protected document, the primary cell (title/ID) and all column values.

Details

FilterViewByPublishAccess (model/publish_access.go:290) drops rows on the hidden/forbidden tier only:

// Table (line 311), Gallery (348), Kanban (385), all identical:
if !CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) {
    row = nil   // hidden/forbidden dropped, but password NEVER checked
}

The three sibling filters all check both the hidden/forbidden tier and the password tier (password == "" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(...)):

• FilterBlockAttributeViewKeysByPublishAccess (line 412)
• FilterBlockInfoByPublishAccess (line 457)
• FilterContentByPublishAccess (line 474)

So the password (protected) tier is enforced everywhere except this AV/database-view filter. Table layout masks nothing; Gallery and Kanban mask only the cover, keeping the card and its non-cover values. Reachable via renderAttributeView, getAttributeViewKeys, and renderSnapshotAttributeView, all CheckAuth-only.

Proof of Concept

Reproduced on a live instance (publish mode on 6808, anonymous Reader, no password cookie), against a password-protected document with a database/AV row.

Check	Path	Result
Control	getDoc(secretDoc)	🔒 placeholder, body withheld password gate works normally
Test	renderAttributeView(AV)	row leaked : blockID=…rk7jofz, title secret-db-row
Differential (disable=true)	same filter	0 rows : hidden tier correctly enforced
Differential (password set)	same filter	1 row : password tier bypassed

Same filter, same document, same Reader: the hidden tier drops the row, the password tier leaks it isolating the omission.

Impact

An anonymous/Reader publish user who has not supplied a protected document's password receives all attribute-view/database rows bound to that document titles, block IDs, and column values defeating the publish-password control for database views. Confidentiality-only. The hidden/forbidden tier is unaffected (correctly enforced).

Suggested fix

Add the password check to the drop condition in all three layout branches (Table, Gallery, Kanban), mirroring the sibling filters:

if !CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(...) ||
   !(password == "" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(c, passwordID, password)) {
    row = nil
}