Summary
Paymenter doesn't reset email verification status after email change
References
Related vulnerabilities
All Supply chain →- CRITICALGHSA-R3CW-C95M-WFH9
motionEye: Authentication possible via password hash
- HIGHGHSA-48PQ-2XQ3-C2M4
CoreWCF: SAML SubjectConfirmation methods and holder-of-key proof keys are not enforced
- CRITICALSC-GHA-OIDC-MISCONFIG-2021
This class covers overly permissive cloud IAM trust policies that federate with GitHub's OIDC provider (token.actions.githubusercontent.com) but fail to constrain which workload may assume the role. The cloud role validates the OIDC token but checks only the audience claim (for example sts.amazonaws.com) while omitting the token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub condition, or it uses a broad wildcard such as repo:org/* or a StringLike pattern instead of StringEquals, so any branch, any fork, or even an attacker-owned repository can mint a valid GitHub OIDC token and exchange it for cloud credentials. Because the sub claim encodes repository, branch, tag, and environment, dropping or loosening it removes the only binding between the role and the intended pipeline, yielding full assumption of the trusted role. Tinder Security Labs documented this in their AWS OIDC research, finding multiple real AWS roles assumable from unauthorized repositories due to missing subject validation, with the successful assumptions visible in CloudTrail. GitHub's OIDC support and the configure-aws-credentials path shipped in 2021, making this a long-standing systemic configuration risk.
- HIGHGHSA-WV27-2VQP-J7G5
Gogs has the ability to import local repositories via Mirror Settings
- HIGHGHSA-PWX3-QCGW-VH7H
Gogs Vulnerable to CSRF Leading to Organization Owner Takeover
- HIGHGHSA-P9F5-H3RX-J5QW
Gogs Missing Authorization in Attachment Download