Summary
Glances is Vulnerable to Command Injection via KVM/QEMU VM Domain Names in glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py
References
Related vulnerabilities
All Supply chain →- HIGHGHSA-C3XH-98XP-6QHF
githubtoplanguages: Command Injection via Issue Title in Discord Notification Workflow
- HIGHGHSA-V75R-VX73-82PJ
@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm: Shell Injection via Unsanitized --workspace Argument
- CRITICALGHSA-4H5R-5JM8-JXJM
gemini-mcp-tool vulnerable to OS command injection and @file exfiltration via prompt quoting (CVE-2026-0755)
- HIGHGHSA-5CJ2-3JR2-5H77
OpenClaw: Shell positional parameters could weaken strict inline-eval checks
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OpenClaw: Exec allowlist could miss side effects from transparent command wrappers
- CRITICALSC-PPE-CICDSEC4-2022
Poisoned Pipeline Execution is the class of attack in which an actor with write access to source control, but no direct access to the build environment, injects attacker-controlled commands that the CI pipeline then executes with its own privileges, secrets, and tokens. Direct PPE (D-PPE) modifies the CI configuration file itself (for example .github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, or a Jenkinsfile) by pushing to an unprotected branch or opening a pull request, so the new pipeline steps run on trigger. Indirect PPE (I-PPE) instead poisons files the pipeline already references, such as a Makefile, test harness, build script, or linter config, when the config is protected but the referenced code is not. Public PPE (3PE) abuses public and open-source repositories that run unreviewed code from anonymous fork pull requests, frequently via the dangerous pull_request_target trigger that grants the fork workflow access to repository secrets. The pattern is catalogued as CICD-SEC-4 in the OWASP Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks (published September 2022) and in Cider/Legit Security research, with real cases including public-repo PPE in popular projects and GitHub Actions workflows abused for cryptocurrency mining.