Summary
Arcane: Delegated users:update permission allows admin account takeover via password reset (no privilege-hierarchy check)
Advisory details
Summary
A user holding the delegated users:update permission can reset the global administrator's password and take over the admin account. UpdateUser sets the target user's PasswordHash from the request body for ANY target with no comparison of caller-vs-target privilege. Because role assignment and role CRUD are deliberately gated by RequireGlobalAdmin, users:update is intended to sit BELOW admin (profile management); this finding defeats that separation.
Root Cause
UpdateUser (handler backend/api/handlers/users.go:317-323) loads the target by ID and sets userModel.PasswordHash from the request body for any user, then userService.UpdateUser (user_service.go:174) simply tx.Saves — with NO actor-vs-target privilege comparison. The only IsGlobalAdmin guard (user_service.go:345) is a last-admin check inside DeleteUser, not the update path. Role assignment / role CRUD are RequireGlobalAdmin (backend/pkg/authz/permissions.go:27-33), proving users:update is intended below admin.
Impact
Complete administrator account takeover (C:H/I:H/A:H) by any holder of the delegated users:update permission.
Proof of Concept
- Admin delegates a custom "User Manager" role with
users:update. PUT /users/{adminId}with{"password":"attacker123"}.POST /auth/login {"username":"arcane","password":"attacker123"}→ admin session.
Attack Chain
- Action: admin delegates custom role with
users:update. Guard: role creation isRequireGlobalAdmin. Bypass: intended delegation (holder is meant to manage profiles, not seize admin). - Action:
PUT /users/{adminId}{"password":"attacker123"}. Guard:RequirePermission(users:update)(users.go:154). Bypass: holder has it; no hierarchy check (users.go:317-323,user_service.go:174unconditional Save). - Action:
POST /auth/loginas admin → admin session.
Bypass Evidence
users.go:317-323setsPasswordHashfor any target;user_service.go:174-194has no actor/target privilege comparison.- Only
IsGlobalAdminhits areDeleteUser's last-admin guard and DTO flags (grep). users:updateis org-level, held by no built-in non-admin role (permissions.go:24).
Affected Versions
<= 2.5.0.
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
References
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p
- https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/security/advisories/GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p
- https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/pull/3426
- https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/commit/21ea962f86d967dac8ae02a050f6e5f043d10fa1
- https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/releases/tag/backend/v2.6.0
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